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Abstract 
In this study, we find that the banks with high degree of risk diversification, and therefore, which are 
presumed to have low probability of bankruptcy and for which the market discipline of being im-
posed higher cost of capital (or, mainly deposit interest rate) with the increase in risk taking is not 
efficiently imposed, tend to have the moral-hazard incentives to connect such advantages of better 
risk diversification to higher risk taking, especially market-related systematic risk taking to increase 
profit. The result of this study suggests a very important policy implication for the stability of bank-
ing industry. If advantage of risk diversification of large banks’ asset portfolio composition, follow-
ing lack of creditors’ motive for surveillance of large banks’ risk-taking behavior, and following 
large banks’ moral hazard is an inevitably occurring phenomenon, increase of simple asset size by 
mergers and acquisitions without additional monitoring system for the risk-taking behavior of these 
large banks has a high possibility to bring about another moral hazard of large banks and cannot be 
expected to surely contribute to the structural stability of banking industry.  
Key words: Banking industry, Risk diversification, Moral hazard, Risk-taking, Capital-market 
risk measures. 
JEL classification: G21 
I. Introduction 
In banking literature, researchers predict that the larger the bank’s asset size is, the higher the de-
gree of risk diversification of the asset-portfolio composition will be. Banking literature also pre-
dicts that large banks, with higher degree of risk diversification, will have the moral-hazard incen-
tives to connect such advantages of better risk diversification to higher risk taking. Because the 
larger the asset size is, the higher the degree of risk diversification of the asset portfolio appears to 
be, thus, investors believe that the possibility of bankruptcy of large banks would be very low. 
Thus, in the case of large banks, positive sensitivity of investors’ required return to taking high 
risk would be very low. The market mechanism of higher cost of capital for greater risk taking 
may not operate as an effective restraint factor for large bank’s risk-taking behavior. Liang and 
Rhoades (1991) found that as bank’s asset size increases, the degree of risk diversification on bal-
ance sheet increases and capital-to-asset ratio decreases. Demsets and Strahan (1997) found a sig-
nificantly positive correlation between the degree of risk diversification in banks measured by R2 
in the market model and asset size. Also, they found that large banks have moral-hazard incentives 
to connect such advantage of better risk diversification to maintenance of low capital-to-asset ratio 
and taking risky projects concentrated on commercial and industrial loans. Akhavein, Berger and 
Humphrey (1997) argued that the main cause of bank mergers is the motivation of high risk-taking 
and increase of profit through it due to increase of asset size. Saunders, Strock and Travlos (1990) 
found that positive correlation exists between asset size and risk taking of which is measured by 
the systematic risk of stock return. 
However, direct study between the degree of risk diversification of banks and risk-taking behavior 
is insufficient in the literature. Most researches first show that the positive correlation exists be-
tween bank’s asset size and degree of risk diversification. Then, based on such relation, by show-
ing the positive correlation between bank’s asset size and risk taking, actually, it wasn’t all direct 
study between the degree of risk diversification and risk-taking behavior. Supplementing the logi-
cal weakness in the precedent studies, this research directly examines the relationship between the 
degree of risk diversification in banks and risk taking employing 76 banks from 1988 to 1997 
listed in U.S. stock market. 
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In this study, using the three capital market-related risk variables measured from the daily stock re-
turns and those on the balance sheet, we directly examined the relationship between the risk diversi-
fication and risk taking. We found that banks with high degree of risk diversification in period t have 
significantly higher incentives to connect such advantage of better risk diversification to pursuit of 
highly risky policy in next period t+1.  
Also, in comparison of group of banks with high degree of risk diversification and group of banks 
with low degree, we found that the increase in degree of risk taking with one unit of increase in 
risk diversification is more significant in the former group than in the latter one. Furthermore, we 
examined the risk-taking behavior of banks in more detail by dividing the risk-taking variable into 
market-related variable and firm-specific variable. We found that the degree of increase in (mar-
ket-related) systematic risk taking with respect to the increase in one unit of the risk diversification 
is significantly higher in the group of banks with higher degree of risk diversification than in the 
group of bank with low degree of risk diversification. In regard to unsystematic risk-taking vari-
able, no significant difference could be found between the two groups. 
Overall, the results in this study show that the banks with high degree of risk diversification, and 
therefore, which are presumed to have low probability of bankruptcy and for which the market 
discipline of being imposed higher cost of capital (or, mainly deposit interest rate) with the in-
crease in risk taking is not efficiently imposed, tend to have the moral-hazard incentives to connect 
such advantages of better risk diversification to higher risk taking, especially market-related sys-
tematic risk. The result of this study suggests a very important policy implication for the stability 
of banking industry. If advantage of risk diversification of large banks’ asset portfolio composi-
tion, following lack of creditors’ motive for surveillance of large banks’ risk-taking behavior, and 
following large banks’ moral hazard is an inevitably occurring phenomenon, increase of simple 
asset size by mergers and acquisitions without additional monitoring system for the risk-taking 
behavior of these large banks has a high possibility to bring about another moral hazard of large 
banks and cannot be expected to surely contribute to the structural stability of banking industry.  
In the next section, we describe the sample of banks. Section 3 describes the variables that are em-
ployed in this study to examine the relationship between the degree of risk diversification and risk 
taking, giving the correlations for the variables. Section 4 presents the hypotheses to be tested and 
the basic regression model used to test them. Section 5 provides a robustness test. Section 6 offers 
concluding comments. 
2. Sample and Data 
The sample for this research consists of 76 bank holding companies for which data are available on 
both the Standard & Poor’s Stock Report and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data 
tapes during the period of 1988-1997. The Standard & Poor’s Stock Report contains year-end bal-
ance sheets and other financial data for the bank holding companies which are publicly traded in 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (ASE) and National Association of 
Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ). From the Standard & Poor’s Stock Report, 
we obtain the data of capital-to-asset ratio, book value of share, asset size and loan-to-asset ratio. Our 
analysis is based on those bank holding companies that traded every day (except for holiday) of each 
year’s 4th quarter for the whole sample period. Daily stock return data are obtained from the CRSP 
data base. Daily returns are adjusted to account for dividend payouts and stock splits.  
3. Variables and Correlation Tests 
In this research, as the measure for bank’s risk taking, three kinds of capital market-related risk-
taking variables (standard deviation, systematic and unsystematic risk of stock returns) are used. If 
the capital market operates quite efficiently, the change of bank’s risk taking activity will sensi-
tively be reflected in the change of stock price. Many precedent research used these capital market 
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risk variables; for example, Saunders, Strock and Travlos (1990), Demsetz and Strahan (1997), 
Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan (1997), Galloway, Lee and Roden (1997) and Esty (1998), etc.  
In this study, capital-to-asset ratio and q-ratio (market-to-book ratio of stock price) are used as 
main explanatory variables influencing bank’s risk-taking as well as R2, which is estimated form 
one-factor market model as the measure for risk-diversification of bank’s asset portfolio. With 
limited liability, stockholders of a corporation can walk away without further losses when the net 
worth of the firm falls below zero. Stockholders can thus increase their wealth at the expense of 
debtholders by pursuing risky strategies. With high level of risk, it is more likely that the return 
from assets will turn out to be very high. High level of risk also increases the possibility of an ex-
tremely low return. Limited liability, however, protects stockholders from incurring additional 
losses when once net worth falls below zero. In other words, with limited liability, it is more likely 
that losses from high risk-taking will be borne ultimately by debtholders, while the benefit from it 
will be captured by stockholders. Thus, the lower the capital-to-asset ratio is, the greater the level 
of risk-taking is. We use the bank’s book value of capital-to-asset ratio since this is the leverage 
measure most commonly monitored by regulators. There are a number of previous studies that 
discovered the negative relationship between capital-to-asset ratio and risk-taking including Gal-
loway, Lee and Roden (1997), Gunther and Robinson (1990), Mckinzey, Cole, and Brown (1992). 
Market-to-book equity ratio of a bank is used as a measure of its charter value reflecting the eco-
nomic value of future growth opportunity. A bank with a high charter value has an incentive to 
avoid risky strategies, since the owners of the bank cannot sell the charter if the bank is declared 
insolvent. Thus, the lower the charter value is, the greater the level of risk-taking will be. Keeley 
(1990) argued that increased competition in the banking sector in the 1980s reduced the charter 
value of banks and thus increased their incentives to take risk. 
In this study, the coefficient of determination (R2) of (one factor) market model is used as the meas-
ure of the degree of risk diversification to examine the relationship between the degree of risk diver-
sification and risk-taking of the bank. There are several studies that used R2 of market model as a 
measure of degree of risk diversification including Barnea and Logue (1973), Roll (1988), and Dem-
setz and Strahan (1997). Insofar as the market index reflects the entire economy, R2 of the market 
model in which the return on market index is the explanatory model and the individual firm’s stock 
return is the explained variable should reflect the degree to which a given firm is related to the econ-
omy in the aggregate – how well the firm mirrors the diversity of the economy and the relative im-
portance attaching to each segment of the firm’s activity within the context of the whole economy. In 
other words, if a variation of market portfolio as an explanatory variable in market model properly 
reflects a variation of the entire economy, the goodness of fit between the stock return of a firm with 
a large degree of asset portfolio’s risk-diversification and the return on market portfolio, (R2), will 
appear high compared to a firm with a small degree of risk-diversification.  
As a preliminary test, correlation coefficients among the capital-to-asset ratio, q-ratio (market-to-
book ratio of stock price), and R2 are estimated first. R2, the measure of the bank’s degree of risk di-
versification, is estimated from one-factor market model that uses the S&P 500 as a market portfolio. 
Capital-to-asset ratio and q-ratio are each bank’s year-end values. As shown in Table 1, there is a 
significantly negative correlation between capital-to-asset ratio and R2. Thus, the degree of risk-
diversification is higher for the banks with lower capital-to-asset ratio. Considering that large banks 
generally have low capital-to-asset ratio, and also are believed to have better diversification in asset 
portfolio, this result may be understood. On the other hand, between q-ratio and capital-to-asset ratio, 
there exists a significantly positive correlation. This means that the lower the capital-to-asset ratio is, 
the more negative evaluation on future growth possibility by investors in the stock market is made. 
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Table 1 
The Pearson correlations among the explanatory variables that are known to affect the risk-taking 
behavior of banks  
 Capital-to-asset ratio q ratio R2 
Capital-to-asset ratio 1   
q ratio 0.1882*** 1  
R2 -0.1453** 0.0429 1 
Note: One, two, or three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, or 1% significance level, 
respectively. 
 
To examine the relationship between the bank’s asset size and the degree of risk diversification, 
Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients are estimated between asset size and R2. As shown 
in Table 2, these coefficients are consistently significantly positive over 1988-1996 period. Thus, 
the degree of risk-diversification is higher for the banks with larger asset size. This result is consis-
tent with that of Barnea & Logue (1973), and Demsetz & Strahan (1997). 
Table 2 
The Pearson and Spearman correlations between the bank’s asset size  
and the degree of risk diversification  
 Pearson correlation Spearman correlation 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
0.19** 
0.52** 
 0.37*** 
0.48** 
0.30** 
0.18** 
0.46** 
0.38** 
0.28*** 
0.36** 
0.23* 
0.47*** 
0.35** 
0.43** 
0.38** 
0.17* 
0.41** 
0.26** 
0.30* 
0.26** 
Note: One, two, or three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, or 1% significance level, 
respectively. 
4. Testable Hypotheses and testing Models 
To examine the relationship between the bank’s risk diversification and moral hazard, we regress 
the following pooled cross-sectional and time-series model over the period of 1988-1997 and esti-
mate the coefficient b3. We estimate lagged regression equation between the degrees of risk diver-
sification and risk taking. 
σi,t+1  = b0 + b1(Capital-to-asset)i,t + b2(q ratio)i,t + b3(R2)i,t + εi,t . (1) 
The result of the above estimation is presented in Table 3. As shown in the table, coefficient b3 is 
significantly positive at 1% significance level. Thus, as the degree of risk diversification at current 
period (t) increases, the risk-taking of the bank at next period (t+1) increases. For the q ratio, the 
coefficient is significantly negative, which is consistent with the implication of the literature. 
However, the coefficient on the capital-to-asset ratio is not negative. 
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Table 3 
The coefficients and t-statistics from pooled cross-sectional, time-series  
regression over the period of 1988-1997  
 Whole sample Group of the banks with higher degree of risk diversification 
Group of the banks with lower 
degree of risk diversification 
Intercept -0.0042 (-0.76) 
0.0112 
(0.96) 
-0.0053 
(-1.43) 
(Capital-to-asset)i,t 
0.0428 
(1.35) 
-7.6×10-5 
(-0.81) 
0.0270 
(1.12) 
(q ratio) i,t 
 
-0.0075 
(-1.38) 
  -0.0319*** 
(-2.82) 
-0.0102 
(-0.12) 
(R2) i,t 
   0.0491*** 
(3.91) 
   0.0470*** 
(2.28) 
0.0413* 
(1.63) 
F-statistic 
Adjusted R2 
No. of observations 
  4.95*** 
0.08 
684 
  6.40*** 
0.07 
342 
2.53* 
0.06 
342 
Note: One, two, or three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, or 1% significance level, 
respectively. σi,t+1  = b0 + b1(Capital-to-asset)i,t + b2(q ratio)i,t + b3(R2)i,t + εi,t. 
 
As an additional analysis about bank’s risk diversification and moral hazard, whole samples are 
divided into two groups: banks with high degree of risk diversification and banks with low risk 
diversification. For each group, the above equation (1) is estimated. In each sample year, if the risk 
diversification index R2 was larger than the median for all banks, a bank was classified as bank 
with high degree of risk diversification, if lower, classified as bank with small degree of risk diver-
sification. The result is also presented in Table 3. As shown in the table, the increase of risk taking 
given one unit of increase of risk diversification is significantly greater for the group of banks with 
high degree of risk diversification than group of banks with low degree of risk diversification. 
Thus, the motivation for moral hazard to connect the advantage of higher risk diversification to 
higher risk-taking is greater for the group of banks with high degree of risk diversification 
The relationship between bank risk diversification and moral hazard is tested further by decompos-
ing the standard deviation of stock returns into two components, systematic risk (β) and unsystem-
atic or firm-specific risk (σ2(ε)). Both β and σ2(ε) are estimated from the one-factor market model 
using the S&P 500 as the market portfolio.  
βi,t+1  = b0 + b1(Capital-to-asset)i,t + b2(q ratio)i,t + b3(R2)i,t + εi,t ,  (2) 
σ2(εi,t +1) = b0 + b1(Capital-to-asset)i,t + b2(q ratio)i,t + b3(R2)i,t + εi,t .  (3) 
As shown in Table 4, the coefficient on R2 is significantly positive for the systematic risk-taking 
variable, β, however, not significant for the unsystematic risk-taking variable, σ2(ε), though posi-
tive. This result indicates that the banks have moral hazard incentives to connect the advantage of 
higher risk diversification to, especially, higher systematic risk-taking. This result may be very 
important if our general belief is that systematic risk may be a more appropriate one for measuring 
the bank’s risk status than unsystematic risk. Many researchers argue that the bank’s riskiest assets 
are loan to large businesses, and the default risk of these loans largely depends on the economic 
fluctuations, and therefore, bank’s risk may well be reflected by its stock-return beta. Also, as 
shown in Table 5, the group of banks with higher degree of risk diversification has significantly 
more incentives for taking systematic risk than the group of banks with lower degree of risk diver-
sification. However, for the unsystematic risk-taking measure, the difference between the two 
groups is not significant. 
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Table 4 
The coefficients and t-statistics from pooled cross-sectional, time-series regression over the period 
of 1988-1997  
 Dependent variable: β i,t + 1 Dependent variable: σ2(ε) i,t +1 
Intercept 
 
0.0882 
(0.70) 
-0.0042 
(-0.03) 
(Capital-to-asset)i,t 
1.3854 
(0.43) 
0.1107 
(0.28) 
 
(q ratio) i,t 
-2.2843 
(-1.50) 
-0.1073 
(-1.25) 
(R2) i,t 
   0.3012*** 
(2.76) 
0.0709 
(1.37) 
F-statistic 
Adjusted R2 
No. of observations 
  5.34*** 
0.08 
684 
  4.42*** 
0.05 
684 
Note: One, two, or three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, or 1% significance level, 
respectively. βi,t+1  = b0 + b1(Capital-to-asset)i,t + b2(q ratio)i,t + b3(R2)i,t + εi,t, σ2(εi,t +1) = b0 + b1(Capital-to-
asset)i,t + b2(q ratio)i,t + b3(R2)i,t + εi,t . 
Table 5 
The coefficients and t-statistics from pooled cross-sectional, time-series regression  
over the period of 1988-1997  
 Dependent variable: β i,t+1 Dependent variable: σ2(ε) i,t+1 
 Group of the banks 
with higher degree of 
risk diversification 
Group of the banks 
with lower degree of 
risk diversification 
Group of the banks 
with higher degree of 
risk diversification 
Group of the banks 
with lower degree of 
risk diversification 
Intercept 
0.0483 
(1.42) 
0.0359 
(0.95) 
-0.0438 
(-0.24) 
0.0017 
(0.13) 
(Capital-to-asset)i,t 
0.9853 
(0.15) 
0.1127 
(0.75) 
-0.0725 
(-0.13) 
0.0347 
(0.88) 
(q ratio) i,t 
-1.8829 
(-1.35) 
-0.9537 
(-1.28) 
-0.0273 
(-0.43) 
-0.0528 
(-0.42) 
(R2) i,t 
  0.3173*** 
(2.69) 
0.0881* 
(1.82) 
0.107 
(0.43) 
0.0588 
(0.42) 
F-statistic 
Adjusted R2 
No. of observa-
tions 
  4.88*** 
0.06 
342 
  5.27*** 
0.04 
342 
 4.07** 
0.5 
342 
  4.75*** 
0.04 
342 
Note: One, two, or three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, or 1% significance level, 
respectively. βi,t+1  = b0 + b1(Capital-to-asset)i,t + b2(q ratio)i,t + b3(R2)i,t + εi,t, σ2(εi,t +1) = b0 + b1(Capital-to-
asset)i,t + b2(q ratio)i,t + b3(R2)i,t + εi,t. 
5. Robustness Test 
The robustness of the previous results is tested employing several balance sheet risk characteristics: 
loan-to-asset ratio, commercial loans-to-total loans, real estate loans-to-total loans, and consumer 
loans-to-total loans. The higher the loan-to-asset ratio is, the greater the degree to which the bank’s 
performance is exposed to economic fluctuation, which would increase the risk of the bank. Also, 
commercial loans and real estate loans are considered to be very risky loans, while consumer loans 
are safer. The previous researches that used balance sheet risk-taking variables include Gunther and 
Robinson (1990), Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan (1997), and Bernanke and Lown (1991). 
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Table 6 
The coefficients and t-statistics from pooled cross-sectional, time-series regression over the period 
of 1988-1997  
 Whole sample Group of the banks with higher degree of risk diversification 
Group of the banks with lower 
degree of risk diversification 
Intercept 
  0.879*** 
(7.27) 
  0.4545*** 
(6.35) 
0.4386** 
(7.28) 
(Capital-to-asset)i,t 
 
0.4286 
(0.42) 
0.5587 
(0.43) 
0.1683 
(1.08) 
(q ratio) i,t 
-0.0788* 
(-1.66) 
-0.0725* 
(-1.72) 
-0.0775* 
(-1.67) 
(R2) i,t 
  0.7288*** 
(4.28) 
  0.7575*** 
(3.69) 
0.4835** 
(2.27) 
F-statistic 
Adjusted R2 
No. of observations 
  7.25*** 
0.07 
684 
  5.17*** 
0.06 
342 
  4.28*** 
0.05 
342 
Note: One, two, or three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, or 1% significance level, 
respectively. (Loan-to-asset) i,t+1  = b0 + b1(Capital-to-asset)i,t + b2(q ratio)i,t + b3(R2)i,t + εi,t. 
As shown in Table 6, the banks with high degree of risk diversification have greater risk-taking 
incentive by maintaining higher loan-to-asset ratio and increasing the risk of business. In compari-
son of two groups, the coefficient on R2  is more significant and greater for the group of banks with 
high degree of risk diversification. Also, as shown in Table 7, we have similar result when the 
risk-taking is proxied by commercial loans-to-total loans ratio, which is another appropriate meas-
ure capturing the degree to which the bank’s operation is exposed to economic fluctuation.  
Table 7 
The coefficients and t-statistics from pooled cross-sectional, time-series regression over the period 
of 1988-1997  
 Dependent variable: 
Commercial loans/Total loans 
Dependent variable: 
Real-estate loans/Total loans 
Dependent variable: 
Consumer loans/Total loans 
 Group of the 
banks with 
higher degree 
of risk  
diversification 
Group of the 
banks with 
lower degree of 
risk  
diversification 
Group of the 
banks with 
higher degree 
of risk  
diversification 
Group of the 
banks with 
lower degree 
of risk  
diversification 
Group of the 
banks with 
higher degree 
of risk diversifi-
cation 
Group of the 
banks with 
lower degree 
of risk diversi-
fication 
Intercept 
0.4356*** 
(4.25) 
0.4359*** 
(4.16) 
0.4619*** 
(4.16) 
0.3469*** 
(3.85) 
0.2138*** 
(3.81) 
0.4315*** 
(3.81) 
(Capital-to-
asset)i,t 
0.4561 
(0.31) 
0.4216 
(0.28) 
0.2769 
(1.26) 
0.8266 
(1.08) 
0.4267 
(0.42) 
0.7216 
(1.13) 
(q ratio) i,t 
 
-0.2135* 
(-1.66) 
-0.7216 
(-1.52) 
0.0943 
(0.81) 
-0.1276 
(-0.13) 
0.1935 
(0.43) 
-0.1038 
(-0.81) 
(R2) i,t 
0.1038** 
(2.13) 
0.1628* 
(1.63) 
0.1637 
(0.98) 
0.3472 
(1.08) 
0.1623 
(0.82) 
0.3416 
(1.10) 
F-statistic 
Adjusted R2 
4.26 *** 
0.08 
5.28*** 
0.06 
3.67 ** 
0.07 
7.28 *** 
0.05 
6.37 *** 
0.03 
5.19 *** 
0.05 
No. of obser-
vations 
342 342 342 342 342 342 
Note: One, two, or three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, or 1% significance level, 
respectively. 
(Commercial loans/Total loans)i,t+1  = b0 + b1(Capital-to-asset)i,t + b2(q ratio)i,t + b3(R2)i,t + εi,t, 
(Real-estate loans/Total loans) i,t+1  = b0 + b1 (Capital-to-asset)i,t + b2 (q ratio)i,t + b3(R2)i,t + εi,t, 
(Consumer loans/Total loans) i,t+1  = b0 + b1 (Capital-to-asset)i,t + b2 (q ratio)i,t + b3(R2)i,t + εi,t. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this study, we find that the banks with high degree of risk diversification, and therefore, which 
are presumed to have low probability of bankruptcy and for which the market discipline of being 
imposed higher cost of capital (or, mainly deposit interest rate) with the increase in risk taking is 
not efficiently imposed, tend to have the moral-hazard incentives to connect such advantages of 
better risk diversification to higher risk taking, especially market-related systematic risk taking to 
increase profit. The result of this study suggests a very important policy implication for the stabil-
ity of banking industry. If advantage of risk diversification of large banks’ asset portfolio composi-
tion, following lack of creditors’ motive for surveillance of large banks’ risk-taking behavior, and 
following large banks’ moral hazard is an inevitably occurring phenomenon, increase of simple 
asset size by mergers and acquisitions without additional monitoring system for the risk-taking 
behavior of these large banks has a high possibility to bring about another moral hazard of large 
banks and cannot be expected to surely contribute to the structural stability of banking industry.  
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